Security architecture for mobile E-health applications in medication control by Gonçalves, Fábio et al.
Security Architecture for Mobile E-Health
Applications in Medication Control
Fa´bio Gonc¸alves
Centro Algoritmi
University of Minho
a44031@alunos.uminho.pt
Joaquim Macedo
Centro Algoritmi / DI
University of Minho
macedo@di.uminho.pt
M. Joa˜o Nicolau
Centro Algoritmi / DSI
University of Minho
joao@dsi.uminho.pt
Alexandre Santos*
Centro Algoritmi / DI
University of Minho
(*corresp. author) alex@di.uminho.pt
Abstract—The use of Radio Frequency Identification techno-
logy (RFID) in medical context enables not only drug identifi-
cation, but also a rapid and precise identification of patients,
physicians, nurses or any other health caregiver. Combining
RFID tag identification with structured and secured Internet
of Things (IoT) solutions enable ubiquitous and easy access to
medical related records, while providing control and security to
all interactions.
This paper defines a basic security architecture, easily de-
ployable on mobile platforms, which would allow to establish
and manage a medication prescription service in mobility context
making use of electronic Personal Health Records. This security
architecture is aimed to be used with a mobile e-health application
(m-health) through a simple and intuitive interface, supported
by RFID technology. This architecture, able to support secured
and authenticated interactions, will enable an easy deployment
of m-health applications. The special case of drug administra-
tion and ubiquitous medication control system, along with the
corresponding Internet of Things context, is used as a case study.
Both security architecture and its protocols, along with a
general Ambient Assisted Living secure service for medication
control, is then analyzed in the context of the Internet of Things.
Keywords—Security Protocols, Cryptography, RFID, Internet of
Things, Ambient Assisted Living, Personal Health Records
I. INTRODUCTION
A problem that the health services in Portugal have, and
also plenty of other countries,is their growing costs, specially
when imply specialized care support in health centers and
hospitals. As a consequence of health care large costs, when-
ever possible, many health services are being relocated from
hospitals to the patient’s home. In order to assure no loss on the
quality of the health services, automated and semi-automated
tools must be used.
From the moment in which the medication is prescribed,
by the physician, until it is administrated to the patient plenty
of mistakes can happen. These can occur due to a misinterpre-
tation of the communication (either written or oral) [1] or to
errors made by the patients themselves when taking the drugs.
The patient must take the right dosage of the right drug at the
right time and this may be controlled by secure access to the
patient’s Personal Health Record (PHR).
In outpatient clinic, most of people take the medication
without any medical or other specialized assistance, increas-
ing the likelihood of errors occurrence, mainly with elderly
patients [2]. To assist this process of medication intake, several
existent technologies may help, as long as the associated
security risks can be minimized. Using the pervasive Internet,
information can be accessed anywhere; using automatic identi-
fication of all participants, processes may be (semi-) automated
and error may be strongly reduced. Undoubtedly, both life and
heavy financial risks may arise when security is compromised.
So, most e-health related applications must enforce strong
security procedures, in order to avoid wrong treatments, wrong
identifications or unauthorized access. Furthermore, a log
record of all significant events must exist, so that any heath
caregiver negligence may be detected.
The Radio-Frequency IDentification, commonly known as
RFID, is used in many applications [3], [4]. The use of this
technology is constantly evolving and is expanding at exponen-
tial rate. There are several methods of identification, although
the most common is a microchip able to store a serial number
that identifies the person, object or thing. Using electronic
devices that emit radio frequency signals, it is possible to
perform an automatic capture of data (in this context called
a tag [5]), from a reader. Therefore, RFID is an acquisition
information technology that enables auto-identification.
The use of Internet to carry information contained in tags
is commonly known as ”Internet of Things” [6], [7]. This term
is defined as objects carrying identity and virtual personality,
which, while working in intelligent spaces, use interfaces
to connect and communicate in a social, environmental and
personal context.
This work analyzes and presents new security protocols
and solutions to integrate in the m-health service architecture
[8], where a remote medication control system for Ambient
Assisted Living, specially aimed at elderly people, is proposed.
Using available technology (self-identification, encryption
and Internet of Things [9]), it is intended to define and evaluate
components with strong security restrictions both in terms of
identification and authentication, at storage and transmission
levels. These components are combined within a security
architecture designed to manage a m-health prescription and
monitoring service adapted to an ubiquitous access in mobile
environments.
A. Motivation
As already mentioned, one of the main objectives of the
security architecture for health services rendering in mobility
context, is to avoid errors in medication intake. This is partic-
ularly important in an outpatient setting and it must be done in
a easy and also strongly secured way, without very specialized
assistance.
In fact, a study carried out in Portugal on ”Adherence
to Medication Regimen in the Elderly” [2] (PhD thesis, in
Portuguese) showed that a large majority of the elderly people
need external help for managing medication. Having carried
out a study with a population of elderly people, the study [2]
stated ”as part of the reasons for non-adherence to medication,
60.5% of the patients indicated forgetfulness and 24.4% stated
they did not have them with them at the time of intake”
and ”interventions (giving advise on drugs, drugs control
and drug education) are effective in increasing adherence”
to medication.
TABLE I. ELDERLY TYPE OF HELP NEEDED (ADAPTED FROM [2])
Help Needed Number %
Manage Medication 119 36,1
Get Info on Medication 63 19,2
Explain Medication regime 44 13,3
Interpeter Medication regime 26 7,9
Monitor Medication regime 20 6,1
Remembering Medication Hours 19 5,8
Filling Drug-dispenser 10 3,0
Monetary Help 7 2,1
Reading Label 8 2,4
Get Drugs Out of box 4 1,2
As one can notice, a large majority of the elderly need
help in medication control, being that 82.8% point out reasons
where semi-automated AAL systems may be of invaluable
help.
B. M-Health Application Scenario
In [8], an e-Health Service is proposed, whose main goal
is to develop a simple m-health service for AAL, based on
RFID and IoT technologies. The main objective of the security
framework presented in this paper is the establishment of a
secure architecture and access control to the information sys-
tem relating patients, prescriptions and medications, in order
to easily verify, specially when in mobility, the compliance
by patients of the prescribed medications and dosages. This
m-health service for AAL assumes that physicians, patients
and medicines are to be identified by means of RFID-tags and
that the whole process, from prescription to pharmaceutical
drug administration, is to be monitored by means of an IoT-
based information system. The whole process begins at a health
facility when the physician prescribes a set of pharmaceutical
drugs to the patient, being both the physician and the patient
identified by means of RFID-tags. These tags are enablers of
the establishment of an IoT architecture and access control
mechanisms to the information system relating patients, pre-
scriptions and medications.
It is assumed that physicians fill out the prescription where
they include the dosage and time when the medication shall
be taken. This information is stored into the e-health system
database, already linked to the RFID tag assigned to each
patient. These tags can be read by RFID readers placed in
any specific hardware but also (and specially) by means of
readers attached to general purpose mobile devices, such as
smart phones, tablets, PDAs, etc.
In such a context, as depicted in Figure 1, the patient
will have a smartphone (or a tablet) running the m-health
application. Physicians, using their own personal or institu-
tional devices (either mobile or fixed) will issue prescriptions
that will be immediately updated in the database. Patients’
mobile device will access that database and will update the
medical recommendations that can be downloaded in order
to be used in offline mode. Mobile devices, using RFID
technology, enables pharmacists to deliver the right medication
to users and enable users to verify that they taking the right
medication at right time. Along this whole process, the security
is a major concern: data confidentiality and integrity must be
assured, users and even applications authentication must be
verified.
Fig. 1. M-Health Application Scenario
II. RELATED WORK
Several studies on Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) to
support elderly people in their daily routine have already been
published, either from Dohr et al [10] presenting smart objects
to facilitate generic tele-monitoring processes, or from Chun-
Liang et al [11] with a framework for using RFID patient
identification within the Taichung Hospital information system.
More recently, other works such as RMAIS [12] have studied
the integration of medication with patients and even some
hardware products, such as special medication dispensers,
arose [13]. These works rely on special hardware devices,
either sensors for tele-monitoring, or special dispensers to
interact with patients.
Another important related work is the service architecture
that will be used as the basis for work presented in this paper,
which is the e-health service architecture and components
proposed in [8].
Figure 2 presents its prototype, starting from the moment
an RFID tag is read and ending with the resolution of the
Electronic Product Code (EPC) [14], [15] information, taken
from an Object Name Service (ONS) [16] server. Results
taken from the Object Name Service will serve as indexing
mechanism to e-health information databases. This service
prototype, developed in Java language, has been set fully
operational (complete details can be found in [8]). To support
general ONS requests several Java classes were developed in
Fig. 2. Schematic of the m-health prototype with ONS resolution (based on [16])
order to read EPCs, perform lookup queries to the ONS service
and access the information databases.
That initial prototype, apart from using SSL and HTTPS,
did not yet include any special security mechanisms. It is
imperative to make this e-health service safer. Therefore, it
is essential to have a security mechanism with strong authen-
tication, able to record the time and the user identification of
all accesses. This enables fraud detection for any system flaw.
There already exists security architectures for e-health
services such as [17]. Unfortunately, such architectures seem to
be too heavy to be used in mobile environments, where devices
have limited capabilities and intermittent network connections.
Of course one should protect both the access to the RFID
data, the access to all the ONS services, and finally the access
to the m-health application and services. For all client - server
interactions, strong authentication (e.g. by using host digital
certification) should be used.
A. Security in Internet of Things (IoT)
To exchange secret information over the Internet, it is
necessary to secure the channel before doing so. The security
may be applied into the different layers of the TCP/IP model.
The usual methods to provide security at the network level,
in the case of packet networks, is datagram encapsulation [18].
One of the most common technologies used to ensure secure
communications in the Internet is the Internet Protocol Security
(IPsec) protocol suite. IPsec is an end-to-end security scheme
operating in the IP stack, enabling both authentication and
confidentiality. Although IPsec ensures these security services
to any protocol in the upper layers, it introduces some overhead
that will reduce throughput.
At the transport layer, the Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
protocol is the standard used all over the Internet. According
to [19] the SSL protocol replaces the TCP/IP sockets with SSL
sockets , simplifying the implementation of a secure end-to-
end secure channel. This approach reduces the implementation
time comparing with the time spent designing another cryp-
tographic system with the same security level. SSL protocol
supports many cipher types that can be used in operations
such as client or server authentication, exchange certificates
or establish session keys. As evolution of SSL there is now
the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [20], with new versions
and some security extensions.
Although SSL provides a very good solution, it authenti-
cates only the machines in both ends, not the applications nor
the users. So a rogue application may try to attack the server
by impersonating a trusted application. Another problem may
be caused by a virus, able to replace the SSL sockets and
capture all the exchanged information, in clear text. Taking this
problems into account, along with the security flaws in health
context, we think that security must be applied also at the
application layer. So, as no normalized and standard protocol
has been yet released, a new application layer security protocol
will be presented to be used in m-health context.
B. Security in Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
There are several types of tags to be used in RFID, which
can vary in many features such as cryptographic primitives,
processing capacity, memory, passive or active. These RFID
tags can be divided in four classes, which are show in Table
II.
TABLE II. TAG CLASSES
Class Tag Type Characteristics
Class 1 Identification tags EPC, tag ID,
optional user memory
Class 2 Extended Bigger ID,
Identification tags Bigger User memory
Class 3 Battery assisted Energy source,
passive Tags Optional data log
Class 4 Active tags Add communications
over an
autonomous transmitter
Almost all studied protocols for securing communications
on RFID are using tags that comply with the standard EPC
Gen2 [21] (EPC Class-1 Generation-2 UHF RFID). These tags
are low cost and their use enables building an average cost
system able to offer a suitable level of security, especially
regarding the protection of privacy [22].
According to [23] security attacks on RFID may be clas-
sified into three main categories: privacy and authentication
attacks, attacks on data integrity and the network availability
attack (Denial of Service (DOS) attacks). The most relevant
protocols to be used with RFID found in literature were RFID
Grouping Proofs [24] and Cryptographic Puzzles [25].
C. Cryptography and Security
The main objective of cryptography [26] is to achieve
confidentiality, integrity, data origin authentication, entity au-
thentication and non-repudiation.
Tools such as hash [19] functions, digital signatures [27],
symmetric and asymmetric keys [27], and public key cer-
tificates, are needed to achieve these features. Public key
certificates are documents that prevent the use of a forged key
to impersonate another entity [19]. Certificates are issued by an
Certification Authority, CA, any trusted central administration
that is willing to testify the validity of the certificates issued.
Most of the cryptographic operations mentioned do not
require an Internet connection; for example, the authenticity
of a certificate may be verified offline. As the certificate has
the CA public key and is signed by it, the only information that
the application needs to know is the validity of the CA public
key. Once the validity is checked, it can verify the certificate’s
authenticity and the authenticity of all messages signed with
the public key in the certificate (but, generally, the Internet
connection may be needed to exchange keys or certificates).
III. SECURITY FOR MOBILE E-HEALTH APPLICATIONS
A. M-Health Security Context
The health environment is very sensitive, and so it has some
very specific security requirements. It is necessary to prevent
any unauthorized access attempt to private information and it
is also important to keep an updated log that records system
failures [8].
In a health environment system is important to balance
system security with availability. A non authorized access may
be harmful to the system or patients, but in case of emergency
if medical personal can’t reach the needed information it can
be even more dangerous, mainly to the patients. Keeping this in
mind, we propose the creation of two types of access: one with
read-only permission and another with a read-write permission.
In this scheme, security may be a little more relaxed in the read
only access, making the information more easily available. In
the read-write access, the security is more strict because adding
or altering important information may be catastrophic, either
financially or even to patients lives.
All the patient’s information to be accessed is assumed
to be manageable in the context of a patient’s electronic
Personal Health Record (ePHR). According to definition from
the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society
an electronic Personal Health Record (ePHR) [28] is a ”[...]
lifelong tool for managing relevant health information, pro-
moting health maintenance and assisting with chronic disease
management via an interactive, common data set of electronic
health information and e-health tools. [...] The ePHR is
owned, managed, and shared by the individual or his or her
legal proxy(s) and must be secure to protect the privacy and
confidentiality of the health information it contains”.
The IT system supporting the patient’s ePHR is to be
accessed by health professionals and patients. The patients
will be given a mobile device from where they will access
the system and their ePHR. The health professionals will be
able to access the system with a mobile device or a laptop.
A read-only access will be made possible with the device
either connected or disconnected to the Internet, but the read-
write access will always require an Internet connection on
account of the (strong) authentication protocol proposed in
this paper. All the accesses to the ePHR must be auditable,
maintaining a robust log that clearly identifies the user, time
of occurrence and associated data operation performed.
Also, all the communications between the RFID tags and
readers will make use of a secure protocol, such as the Group-
ing Protocol proposed by [22] or the cryptographic puzzles
proposed by [25]. The protocol proposed by [22] should be
more appropriate to apply in this case, mainly for establishing
the association between medication-prescription-patient, once
it was designed by [22] with that purpose. On the other hand,
to exchange the tag ID with the application for authentication
purposes, the protocol proposed by [25] is certainly more
suitable. With this new approach by [25] to the RFID security,
the tags generate a puzzle for the reader to solve, making use
of a time bounding protocol that increases the puzzle difficulty
with the increasing of the tag-reader distance.
B. M-Health Security Protocol
A new security protocol aimed at mobile e-health appli-
cations, identified as M-Health Security Protocol (MHSP),
is proposed and presented within this section. The proposed
protocol (cf Fig. 3) finds its roots on the well known SSL
protocol. Instead of using it in the traditional transport layer,
MHSP was aimed at the application layer. This choice was
made due to the great security provided by the SSL, noticing
also that SSL is widely used in the global Internet.
This protocol provides a secure channel over the Internet
and authentication between the applications. The authenti-
cation between applications is achieved using Public Key
Certificates. This certificate can be verified by a Certificate
Authority (CA).
Following, it will be explained in detail the proposed
MHSP protocol. Will be assumed that CApp is the client
application and S is the server’s application, CC the client
application certificate and SC server certificate. The message
with order n exchanged between entities is represented by mn
and RN the random data with order N generated by the appli-
cation. Likewise enc(M,K) is the ciphering of the message M
with key K and dec(M,K) is the opposite operation. SpubKey
and SprivKey are the server’s public and private key, the same
happens with CApppubKey and CAppprivKey, but in this case
are the client’s keys. Finally gen(key) generates the desired
key.
1) The client application sends its own certificate to the
server.
CApp→ S : CC
Fig. 3. M-Health Security Protocol (MHSP) interactions
2) The Server Application verifies the validity of the
received certificate, terminating the connection if not
verified.
if (CC is invalid)
then Connection terminated
else S → CApp : SC
3) The Client Application verifies the validity of the
received certificate and if is invalid, the connection
is terminated. Otherwise it will generate a challenge
so it can verify the server authenticity.
if SC is invalid
then Connection terminated
else m1 = enc(< V,R1 >,SpubKey)
CApp → S : m1
4) In this phase the server will have to prove his authen-
ticity to the client using the challenge received. Then
it will generate the session and communications keys.
< V,R >= dec(m1, SprivKey)
gen(Sesskey)
m2 = enc(< R1, Sesskey >,CApppubKey)
S → CApp : m2
gen(Commkey)
m3 = enc(Commkey, Sesskey)
S → CApp : m3
5) With the reply the client application can verify the
servers authenticity and obtain the session and com-
munications keys
< R1, Sesskey >= dec(m2, Cprivkey )
if R1sent equal R1received
then Commkey = dec(m3, Sesskey)
gen(R2)
m4 = enc(< ”Hello”, R2 >,Commkey)
CApp→ S : m4
else Connection terminated
6) Finally the server will decipher the message m4 sent
by the client application and, if deciphered correctly,
it means that the client application was able to deci-
pher the Commkey correctly and the is authenticated.
if dec(m4, Commkey)
then Authenticated
else Connection terminated
Previously are mentioned two symmetric keys: session
key and communications key. To make sure each key isn’t
used too many times, the session key is used to cipher the
communications keys. Only the communications keys will be
used to communicate between applications. Thus, since the
communications keys are always changing, even if an attacker
discovers one key it will only work for a short period of time.
The purpose of ”Hello” message sent with the random data
(R2) is to make the result from enc(< ”Hello”, R2 >) always
different.
The cipher algorithm to be used will be pre-defined and
may vary according to the version of the protocol. This way
the server will be able to identify which cipher algorithm the
client application is using by its version number. The server
may refuse the connection if the algorithm used in that version
is not secure enough.
C. User Authentication in M-Health Context
In order to solve the authentication problem in e-Health
context for medication control, were proposed two possible
scenarios: one for prescription writing (read-write operations)
and another one for prescription consultation (read-only opera-
tions); these scenarios will be identified by Secure User authen-
tication (SUA) and User Authentication (UA), respectively. For
both methods it is assumed that the user authentication protocol
will make use of the communication channel already establi-
shed and secured with the MHSP (presented in section III-B).
Before presenting the authentication protocols it is necessary
to define the registration process of each user.
1) Registration process: The registration must be done
by an entity trusted by the system (CA). The registration
for both types of users must be done in person (parallel
channel) avoiding incorrect identification. The user name that
is traditionally used will be replaced by a RFID user ID, being
that the user RFID tag is also delivered in person. Once this
protocol is designed to be used in mobile applications, this will
make user authentication easier for the user (of course, only
when complemented by other means; the simple possession of
the tag will not entitle its carrier the user identification).
For the UA the CA will only issue an user password and
a RFID tag with an user ID. The password must be given to
the user in a closed envelope. This password can be changed
later in the client application, after strong authentication. The
CA must store in the database a hash made from the user
password. It is chosen to store only the password hash to
protect the real password, the password hash gives only access
to the access with UA. Anyone that enters the system in read-
only mode won’t be able to access operations as a Secure
User Authentication (SUA) would, nor accessing offline files,
as described in section III-C3.
For sure, an authentication scheme based on login and
password is not a very secure method. Thus, it is proposed
that, just like the SSL protocol, the CA also issues Public Key
Certificates for each user needing Secure User Authentication,
SUA. In this case the CA will issue for each user a password
(in a sealed envelope), a RFID tag and a Public Key Certificate.
The certificate must have a very well-defined expiration date.
The CA will cipher the generated private keys with a symmet-
ric key. This key is obtained from a hash with the input made
from from the n-tuple <user password, user ID>. The
public keys and the ciphered secret keys may be delivered to
the user using a smart card. This smart cart may be a simple
memory card as this won’t need any computation.
The password given to the user may be changed by the
client application. The user inserts his password and the
application can read his ID from the tag, so the application
can decipher the secret keys. If the user inserts another
password, the application can cipher the secret keys with the
new password.
2) User Authentication: To achieve simple user authentica-
tion a more relaxed method is proposed - a simple login and
password method - and will be identified as M-Health User
Authentication (cf Fig. 4), MHUA.
Fig. 4. M-Health User Authentication (MHUA)
In this simple case, the application reads the user ID
from his RFID tag and asks the user for his password. The
client application will then create an hash made from the user
password and send it to the server. The server will then just
verify if the hash received matches the one in the database for
that user. This method is easy to use and, although it is not
as secure as the method in section III-C3, it provides a good
level of security, because this exchange is carried out over the
secure channel created by the MHSP.
3) Secure User Authentication: For a Secure User Au-
thentication, SUA, it is necessary keeping in mind that one
successful attack may lead to privileges that enable one to
change a patient prescription and, eventually, putting his life
in danger. So, it is necessary to design a strong authentication
protocol.
The authentication protocol M-Health Secure User Authen-
tication (MHSUA)( Fig. 5) proposed in this paper is based
in Public Key Certificates. As mentioned in the registration
(III-C1) phase, each user must have a password, a RFID tag,
and a physical support - for instance a Smart Card1 - with
the public key certificate and the secret keys ciphered with the
password. In this protocol there won’t be any secret informa-
tion (such as the password) exchanged using the network.
Following is the protocol in detail. The assumptions taken
above in the MHSP protocol are taken in account. we also
assume that pass is the user password and TagID is the user
ID from the tag. Also UC is the user certificate and UpubKey
and UprivKey are the user public and private keys. Finally
encprivate is the ciphered private key stored in the smart card,
a||b is the concatenation between a and b and hash(m) is the
hash from the input m.
1) First, the client application must read the TagID
2) The user selects the SUA authentication method and
the application will ask for the smart card.
3) After reading the UC and the corresponding private
key from the smart card the application will ask for
the pass.
4) The client application will then get the private keys
using the password.
UprivKey = dec(encprivate, hash(pass||TagID))
CA→ S : UC
5) The server will then verify the authenticity of the
UC and then generate a challenge to test client’s
authenticity.
if UC is valid
then Connection terminated
else m1 = enc(R1, UpubKey)
S → CApp : m1
6) To prove his authenticity the client application
must be able to decipher the message m1 using the
UprivKey.
m2 = dec(m1, UprivKey)
CApp→ S : m2
7) If the received message is equal to the random data
generated, the user authentication will be verified.
if m2 = r1
then User authenticated
else Connection terminated
In the protocol above, the last message exchanged between
the client and the server applications, does not need to be
ciphered once the channel is already secure with the MSHP
protocol.
1Storing the certificate and the private keys in a smart card is not mandatory.
They can be stored in any keystore or support because even if an attacker gets
access to them he won’t be able to access the system since he hasn’t the user
password to decipher the secret keys.
Fig. 5. M-Health Secure User Authentication (MHSUA)
D. Offline User Access
The protocols described previously in this paper are not
appropriated for offline operations. They the need the client
application connected to the server. To overcome this restric-
tion, the client may store/cache data (using a time-to-live
parameter) in his own device, for offline access. The user must
be previously authenticated, using one of the above methods
before being able to access and download the data. These are
basically prescriptions then stored in a secure cache, within
the mobile device.
The data storage method proposed in this work, named
as M-Health Offline User Access, enables an offline se-
cure access. M-Health Offline User Access uses a sym-
metric key. Such key is computed using a hash from
a n-tuple <user password, tag ID, name file,
file creation date>. This method assures that every
file has a different key. If a given key is broken all other files
will remain secured. To ensure file security, the size of each file
must be limited. The application must use its key to sign each
prescription before it is ciphered, assuring the prescription’s
integrity and authentication. Using this method one can ensure
that even if different users share the application in the same
device, each one will only have access to own prescriptions.
As already stated, each prescription must have its own
expiration date, trustable since it is updated from a secure,
identified and authenticated connection to the server; otherwise
it will be marked as unusable. Therefore, this secured caching
mechanism, with its temporal constraints, provides a method
enabling users to control medication intakes even if the server,
or their own device, is temporarily offline. Furthermore, it will
enable users to update/refresh, whenever connected, the local
cache and use it later on when the device is in disconnected
mode, for instance when the user moves out if Internet access.
IV. MHSP SECURITY ANALYSIS
The MHSP protocol and MHSUA are based in a known
secure protocol so, if the chosen cipher algorithms are strong
enough the MHSP is safe. One of the most important points
of the proposed protocols is the keys life time. It has to be
carefully defined according to the chosen ciphers.
The database is assumed to be secure and only accessed
with the MSHP protocol. Otherwise, the user data will be
compromised, even if the used protocols are not.
To be correctly authenticated a user must have at least
the tag ID, the user password and a client application with
the correct public key certificate and its private keys. If the
application certificate is written in a way that it has for
example: the device name and network drive mac address; an
attacker that has access to the application and its certificate and
private keys, will also have to change his device name and his
device mac. Thus, to have UA authentication an attacker must
first of all, have physical access to the user device so he can
get the private key. Then read the user tag ID and finally he
has to find out the user password making the UA access from
an attacker almost infeasible, mainly in a large scale.
The MHSUA has more security than MHUA, so it is even
harder to an attacker break in. To do this, an attacker must
also have the user public key certificate and its private keys.
To just sniff the data exchanged between applications, a
possible attacker needs to have the application private key. To
do this, the attacker needs to have physical access to the user
device and this will only work for a limited time, whereas that
when the certificate validity ends there must be generated a
new public key for the client.
In conclusion it is possible to attack the proposed protocols
and authentication methods, but they require physical access
to the user devices. The proposed MHSP protocol may be
vulnerable by Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, but as the pro-
posed protocol is meant to prescriptions consultation mainly
in ambulatory scenarios, if a user cant access a prescription
for a few minutes it does not present any major risks.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a set of basic security m-health mech-
anisms, easily deployable on mobile platforms, which would
allow medication control, supported by RFID technology in
Internet of Things context. Apart from managing the whole cy-
cle, from physicians prescription to patient intake and alarms,
this architecture also keeps a secure and auditable log record of
all significant events and interactions with the patient’s ePHR,
so that any health caregiver may be implied in the process, even
if the patient is at home. A pharmacist cannot repudiate that
the physicians’ prescription was delivered. Any nurse or other
caregiver cannot repudiate to have dispensed a given medicine,
at a given time, in the presence of a given patient. All this for
the best of the patient’s interest. Although one makes use of
Internet of Things and, probably public, Internet connections,
the whole system is secured, even at application level.
A new secure application layer protocol, identified as
M-Health Security Protocol (MHSP), has been presented and
its properties described. M-Health Security Protocol provides
an application level secure channel for (mobile) client-server
interactions, allowing strong authentication from both users
and mobile devices. The use of RFID tags to identify entities,
combined with an RFID Grouping Protocol, and with the
M-Health Security Protocol, provide a complete and common
security framework to implement Mobile E-Health Applica-
tions for Medication Control.
Current developments are now focused on the implemen-
tation of this security framework into the prototype for the
mobile application for medication control. This work is in
line with e-health service architecture and components already
developed within the same project, such as the resolution of
the Electronic Product Code using a versatile Object Name
Service
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